

BOOK REVIEW

Clarke, Randolph, *Libertarian Accounts of Free Will*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

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Until fairly recently, a brief review of the free will literature would have strongly suggested that compatibilists were winning the argument. At least, so it would have seemed were a poll the way to determine such things: there were simply more philosophers purporting to believe that freedom, when rightly analyzed, is compatible with determinism than philosophers purporting to deny it. In part, this was due to the desire of many philosophers to offer analyses of ordinary concepts under which the ordinary and the manifest can persist side-by-side with the facts as reported by the natural sciences. There is no particular reason, however, to think that the naturalistic commitments of those wanting to preserve our ordinary judgments about the freedom of ourselves and others require compatibilism, for there is no particular reason to think that determinism is true, that the sciences tell us it is, or that belief in it is a necessary condition of scientific inquiry. Since for all that science tells us determinism very well might be false, preserving our freedom does not require a compatibilist theory of it. Thus, in recent years, incompatibilism has shown a resurgence, and among the resurgent are philosophers wedded to some form of naturalism. Randolph Clarke's *Libertarian Accounts of Free Will* offers a careful, often insightful examination of the prospects for an adequate naturalist libertarian incompatibilism; the book examines, that is, theories of freedom under which free action is possible should determinism be false and should the world be as the natural sciences tell us it is. It is an excellent book that anyone interested in this topic should read.

Clarke divides incompatibilist libertarian views into three sorts: non-causal, event-causal and agent-causal accounts. According to noncausal accounts, it is possible for an act to be free despite the fact that neither the action nor any event closely related to it is caused. This is not to say that noncausal accounts positively insist that free

actions are, or involve, uncaused events; some views of this sort do insist on this, but others simply do not appeal to causation in their analyses of the full range of free actions, thus leaving open the possibility that at least some free actions involve only uncaused events. Carl Ginet's position, according to which every free action either is or involves a basic free action marked by its "actish phenomenal quality," is taken by Clarke as a paradigm example of a noncausal view.¹ After all, for Ginet, should a basic act have this "actish phenomenal quality" and be uncaused it would still be a free action; neither its causes nor its internal causal structure (were it to have any) are relevant to the question of whether or not such an act is free.

Clarke spends just one short chapter examining noncausal accounts. By way of comparison, he spends five chapters in discussion of event-causal accounts and three of agent-causal. Clarke appears to take non-causal accounts to go much less far in accounting for the fundamental and defining features of free action than views of the other two sorts. The primary problem he identifies for such views, however, seems to me to be somewhat less decisive than Clarke makes it out to be.² The problem, as he sees it, is that noncausal views cannot account for the sense in which free actions involve active control on the part of the agent whose acts they are. In support of this contention, he writes, of Ginet's position,

[A]n event with the actish phenomenal quality could be brought about by external brain stimulation, in the absence of any relevant desire or intention on the part of the "agent". Given that what is at issue is an intrinsic phenomenal quality, there would appear to be no grounds for disallowing such a thing. But an event produced in this way and in these circumstances hardly seems to be an exercise of agency at all.³

It is important to distinguish the objection Clarke is making to Ginet's view from the objection he is making to any noncausal position. One might criticize a noncausal position on the grounds that it misidentifies that feature of some acts by virtue of which they are *acts* without suggesting that the problem derives from a failure to put causal conditions into the account. One might think, for instance, that a mere feeling attending certain events cannot account for their,

¹ Carl Ginet, *On Action* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

² Clarke identifies a second problem, as well. He thinks that many free actions are done for reasons, a notion that he thinks must be analyzed causally.

³ Randolph Clarke, *Libertarian Accounts of Free Will* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 20.

or other events' status as action, even if the feelings in question were to play some kind of causal role in bringing about the relevant events. That would not amount to an objection to noncausalism *per se*; even if successful, such an objection would leave room for the possibility of a better noncausal view, a view that appeals to something other than a mere feeling. Clarke takes himself, however, to be objecting to any noncausal position, and so he seems to be saying that noncausalism cannot provide for active control because there is always the possibility that the agent is passive with respect to that from which activity putatively springs.

Notice that the form of argument here is of the sort sometimes levied against those who take actions, events with respect to which the agent exercises some degree of active control, to be events in themselves passive that are caused by other events in themselves passive. On such views, actions are *actions* not because the agent is active with respect to their causes, but because the agent bears some other relation to their causes; activity, on such views, emerges from the relations among intrinsically passive events and the agent. On a view, for instance, according to which a bodily movement caused (non-deviantly) by belief-desire complexes is action, the agent need not be active with respect to the belief-desire complex; rather, belief-desire complexes are thought, by advocates of such positions, to bear some other important relation to the agent – a tie, for instance, to his rational capacities, or some distinctive form of “internality” – that accounts for the agent's activity with respect to their effects. It is naturally objected that under such views the causes of the action-constituting antecedents of action could include the likes of “external brain stimulation,” or some other force with respect to which the agent is passive, without thereby rendering the agent passive with respect to their effects. On such views, that is, the causes of the relevant belief-desire complexes are not relevant to the question of whether or not the agent is active with respect to their effects. But this is not much of an objection to such positions, for it simply amounts to asserting as an objection precisely what the advocate of the view already accepts. A stronger form of objection presses on the passive states causation by which constitutes action, on such views; why is it that the relation, whatever it is, that such states bear to the agent makes it the case that the relevant effects are *actions*? How can activity arise from passivity? Similarly, there is a legitimate question to be raised against Ginet, for instance, as to why the “actish phenomenal quality” of an event should account for the event's status

as action. As Clarke points out, it is far from clear how a mere feeling could do this kind of work. But the obstacle to its doing so cannot be merely that events of that sort could be brought about through processes over which the agent exercises no active control, as Clarke suggests. Arguably, it is a virtue of Ginet's position that this is so: it means that the position allows for the possibility that activity can emerge from combinations of events which, when taken individually, are nothing but mere happenings.

There is a further, important point to be made here: Clarke presses the point that libertarian incompatibilists can and should accept causal theories of action – theories that take an event's status as action to derive from the fact that it is caused by certain special events, bearing a special relation to the agent. In fact, this is a particularly interesting and important aspect of Clarke's thought on these matters, since it suggests that incompatibilists can make what looks (but only looks) like a large concession to compatibilists without, Clarke argues, giving up their fundamental disagreement with them. Even if actions are nothing but events which, when considered individually, no one is active with respect to, still there might be a need for the falsity of determinism if those acts are to be free. But given this aspect of Clarke's position, he, in particular, should not object to noncausal accounts on the grounds that he does. One cannot accept the kind of theory of action that Clarke endorses without rejecting objections of the form that he levies against Ginet and other advocates of noncausal views.

The point just made should, perhaps, be put a bit more modestly: Clarke asserts that active control of action is, necessarily, a causal phenomenon; to have active control of an event is to have some kind of causal control of it. This may very well be true, but it is a difficult point to argue for and it cannot be supported merely by suggesting that, on views that deny it, the agent can be thought to be active with respect to one event despite being passive with respect to that which, supposedly, accounts for his being active. As I have suggested, *that*, after all, is a commitment of many causal theories of action of the sort that Clarke endorses.

Clarke spends much more space in consideration of event-causal accounts. In fact, he gives such views a more thorough and careful treatment than anyone else has to date. According to such positions, free actions are indeterministically caused by what Clarke aptly calls "agent-involving events." The idea is that theories of this sort appeal

to exactly the same sorts of mental states and events as antecedents of free action as do compatibilists. Such views differ from those of compatibilists only in requiring that the causal relation between those agent-involving events and free action is, necessarily, indeterministic. An event-causal account that asserts only this much Clarke refers to as an “unadorned” account. Various incompatibilists, such as Robert Kane,⁴ advocate event causal positions and add further conditions to their accounts of free action. Clarke argues convincingly that, first, an agent whose action satisfies the conditions for freedom specified by an unadorned view possesses many of those valuable things that we take a free agent to possess and, second, adorning the view adds nothing further of value. The simple theory is just as good as the more complex.

Clarke takes unadorned event-causal views to provide everything that the most sophisticated forms of compatibilism provide, and more. So, for instance, if a compatibilist is right to think that something of value is secured when the effectiveness of an agent’s first order motivations depends on her endorsement of their effectiveness,⁵ then the event-causal incompatibilist can secure that very same valuable thing and in the same way, for the compatibilist does not require, but merely permits, that the causal relation between higher order attitudes and effective first order motivation be deterministic. The event-causal libertarian can get all that the compatibilist gets *plus* whatever theoretical benefits, if there are any, can be gained through insisting that the relevant causal relations be indeterministic. And, further, Clarke argues that there are many benefits to be gained through the addition of indeterministic causation. For instance, by appeal to indeterministic causal relations, it is possible to account for the sense in which the future is open to us as it appears to be when we deliberate, something which he takes compatibilists to be incapable of explaining. When an event is indeterministically caused, there would have been no violation in the laws of nature had a different, incompatible event taken place, even given exactly the same past; the road, we might say, really does branch, just as it appears to us to do when we deliberate.

⁴ Robert Kane, *The Significance of Free Will* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

⁵ As on the view advocated in Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” *The Journal of Philosophy* 68 (1971), pp. 5–20.

Although Clarke has made the point in earlier work,⁶ in the book he decisively demonstrates that event-causal incompatibilists can reap the benefits of compatibilist's views without incurring the compatibilist's determinist liability. In order to show this, Clarke needs to show, among other things, that there is no form of explanation of action that can be provided by a deterministic cause but not by an indeterministic. It has sometimes been suggested, for instance, that indeterministically caused events cannot be given contrastive explanations – explanations that say not just why the event occurred, but also why it occurred *rather than* some other event that also would have been consistent with the laws of nature and the past. Clarke argues that, in fact, even indeterministically caused events can sometimes be contrastively explained and there is little of value lost in the absence of contrastive explanations of others. The case, then, that Clarke makes for thinking that event-causal libertarianism ought to build on, rather than reject, the insights of compatibilism marks a very important contribution to the literature and should have a great influence on further developments of event-causal views.

In insisting that event-causalism secures all that the best compatibilisms secure and more, Clarke finds himself defending the following position: If determinism is compatible with moral responsibility, although incompatible with free will (as many now believe⁷), then an unadorned event-causal libertarianism provides a fully adequate account of the nature of free action. However, if determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility as well as free will (perhaps because no one can be genuinely deserving of blame if determinism is true) then event-causal libertarianism is no better than compatibilism, which is inadequate by definition under such a condition. The idea here is simpler than this summary makes it sound: The good things that are secured by event-causal views that are not secured by compatibilism (i.e., genuine openness of alternatives) get event-causal views closer to explaining the basis of free will. But the good things that are secured by event-causal views that are relevant to explaining the basis of moral responsibility are also secured by compatibilism. Hence, event-causalists are committed to insisting on the compatibility of moral responsibility and determinism.

⁶ Randolph Clarke, "Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will," *Nous* 27 (1993), pp. 191–203.

⁷ This "semi-compatibilist" position is defended, most notably, in John Fischer, *The Metaphysics of Free Will* (London: Blackwell Publishers, 1994).

Clarke's commitment to this position derives, in part, from an assumption: he is assuming that all that is required for genuine desert of blame and praise is a certain sort of active control of the action for which one is blamed or praised. Given this assumption, it is no surprise that event-causal incompatibilists can do no better (and, it is worth emphasizing, no worse) than compatibilists in identifying the necessary conditions of desert of blame and praise, for event-causalists do not add to compatibilist accounts of active control but, instead, simply co-opt compatibilist accounts for their own purposes. However, it is not clear that Clarke's assumption is correct. To know if it is, we would need to know much more about desert. In fact, one can imagine plausible conceptions of desert under which the assumption would turn out to be false. For instance, one might imagine that *S* deserves blame for his action only if the action made a genuine difference to the world, where this notion of "difference-making" is given a construal friendly to incompatibilism. Clarke thinks that difference-making of this kind can be accounted for by event-causal libertarianism, but not by compatibilism. Hence this view of desert would undermine the claim that event-causal views do no better than compatibilist views in accounting for moral responsibility. Another way to put the point: there is a well-known literature regarding the relevance, if any, to moral responsibility of the availability of alternative possibilities.⁸ And it is quite possible that those who take alternatives to be irrelevant to responsibility will win that argument. If they do, then *merely by securing alternative possibilities*, the event-causal libertarian gets no closer to accounting for the basis of moral responsibility than does the compatibilist. However, as Clarke emphasizes, we care about free will not just because we care about the availability of alternatives. We also think the actions of those with free will make a difference to the world, and we think of free will as part of what it is for a person to enjoy the special sort of dignity that only persons can. Why should we not think that these other facets of free will are necessary for moral desert? If they are, then event-causal libertarians, in so far as they are able to explain them, can do better in explaining moral responsibility than compatibilists can, contrary to Clarke's claim.

⁸ The literature is vast, but a recent anthology draws together many essays on the topic: David Widerker and Michael McKenna (eds.), *Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities* (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2003).

Be that as it may, if one accepts Clarke's claim that the freedom necessary for desert is marked by a distinctive form of active control, and if one accepts the premise that moral desert is incompatible with determinism, then one is left looking for more than can be provided by any event-causal account. At this point, Clarke turns to consideration of the third kind of incompatibilist libertarianism: agent-causalism. Agent-causal accounts appeal, somewhere in the analysis of free action, to an irreducible causal relation between an agent, construed as a substance, and some event.⁹ The relation is "irreducible" in the sense that it cannot be realized by any combination of events standing in causal relations, or any other relations, to one another. Typically, for instance, agent-causalists insist that for an act to be free, a volition, decision, choice, or other mental event must be caused by the agent.¹⁰

Clarke takes the most plausible form of agent-causal theory to be what he calls "integrated agent-causalism." The integrated agent-causalist thinks that free actions are both indeterministically caused by certain agent-involving events and caused by the agent. Clarke describes the view in the following passage, which is worth quoting at length:

Suppose that on some occasion a certain agent, Diana, is deliberating about whether to pursue a certain course of action A1 or an alternative A2. She has reasons favoring each and an intention to make up her mind now. Suppose that there is a nonzero probability that R1 – Diana's having the reasons favoring A1 – (together with her having the indicated intention) will nondeterministically cause, in an appropriate way, her making a decision D1 to pursue A1; and suppose that there is, as well, a nonzero probability that R2 – Diana's having the reasons favoring A2 – (together with her having the intention) will instead nondeterministically cause, in an appropriate way, her making a decision D2 to pursue A2. Then, given all prior conditions, it is genuinely open to Diana to make the former decision and genuinely open to her to make the latter instead. Now suppose that, as a matter of nomological necessity, in the circumstances, whichever of the open decisions the agent makes, that decision will be made, and it will be caused by the agent's having the reasons that favor it (together with her having the intention to make up her mind) only if the agent causes that decision...Finally, suppose that, in fact,

⁹ Clarke thinks that there are no good reasons for thinking that only agents, and not inert substances, can be causes. For discussion of two interesting arguments in support of that contention offered by Thomas Reid, see Gideon Yaffe, *Manifest Activity: Thomas Reid's Theory of Action* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), Chapters 1 and 2.

¹⁰ Clarke holds that agent-causal theorists can allow that non-mental events are caused by agents and, in fact, he thinks that agent-causal theories are stronger when they allow this. He is almost surely right about this.

Diana makes decision D1. Her decision is caused by her, and it is non-deterministically caused, in an appropriate way, by R1 and the present-directed intention to make up her mind. On the proposed integrated agent-causal view, the agent's exercise of direct active control consists in her action's being caused, in this way, by her and by these sorts of agent-involving events.¹¹

A crucial part of the integrated agent-causal position here sketched is the nomological necessity of the following proposition:

(*) The decision the agent makes will be caused by her having the reasons for which she acts *if and only if* it is caused by her.¹²

The view is that an agent's decision is free only if (*) is nomologically necessary. Why is this claim an essential part of an integrated agent-causal position? Why would it not be enough, for instance, for the integrated agent-causalist to say that it is in fact the case that every free action is caused both by the agent's having certain reasons and by the agent herself, even though it would be perfectly consistent with the laws of nature for one or the other cause to be absent? Clarke is a bit less explicit in his answer to this question than one might like. But an answer can be, nonetheless, found in the book. Before rehearsing it, first notice that if (*) were not nomologically but instead conceptually necessary, then the integrated agent-causal position would collapse into an event-causal position in which agent-causation is reduced to event causation, causation by the agent's having of certain reasons. After all, those wishing to reduce agent-causation to event causation – those wishing, that is, to say what it is for an agent to cause an event by appeal to certain special events that cause it – would offer a biconditional of precisely the same form as (*), but would insist that it is a conceptually necessary truth.

So, the integrated agent-causalist does not want to say that (*) is conceptually necessary. But imagine what the theory would look like if (*) were not even nomologically necessary, if it were merely a contingent fact that agent-causation and causation by reasons co-occur in free actions. If that were the view, then it would appear

¹¹ Clarke, *Libertarian Accounts of Free Will*, p. 136.

¹² In the passage, Clarke only mentions the forward direction of this biconditional. However, he commits himself to the backward direction, as well, given an assumption: that the causes of an event that account for its being action include the agent's having of reasons (See Clarke, *Libertarian Accounts of Free Will*, pp. 145–146). However, Clarke also allows the possibility that an agent could make a decision for one set of reasons, and not for another set favoring the very same decision, despite having both sets of reasons (See Clarke, *Libertarian Accounts of Free Will*, p. 147). I have formulated (*) in such a way as to allow for this possibility.

either that what the agent's reasons cause is not a matter of what he agent-causes, or that what the agent causes is not a matter of what he has reasons to do. It would appear, that is, that from one point of view the agent would be causally redundant, and from another his reasons would be; and there would not, it seems, be any middle ground for the integrated agent-causalist to occupy. In fact, Ginet has objected to Clarke's integrated agent-causalism on something very close to these lines.¹³ In reply, in the book, Clarke appeals to the fact that (*) is nomologically necessary.¹⁴ Given the nomological necessity of (*), it is true that were the agent not to agent-cause a particular decision, she would not make that decision, for were she not to agent-cause the decision her having of reasons favoring it would also not cause that decision. And, conversely, were her reasons not to cause a particular decision, then neither would she.

Roughly, the point is that the nomological necessity of (*) is what *integrates* the agent-causal and the event-causal. If the agent and the relevant events supplied two disconnected causal influences on action, then the account would not be capturing the close connection between what the agent herself adds to a free action and what is added by her reasons. Clarke's integrated agent-causalist wants the work of reasons and the work of the agent to be distinct, and yet to walk in lock-step. The nomological necessity of (*) is intended to supply that. And, it should be said, it is a virtue of integrated agent-causalism that it makes a serious attempt at this form of integration. Free action springs from the agent's exercise of her rational powers. The trick is to say in what sense this is true without either leaving nothing for the agent to do that is not done by her reasons, or else nothing for the reasons to do that is not done by the agent. The nomological necessity of (*) is intended to help the integrated agent-causalist to perform the trick.

Clarke thinks that an integrated agent-causal position can go a great way towards providing an adequate account of free will. Under such an account, fully free actions have all the virtues secured by a compatibilist view: after all, they appeal to causation of action by all the same mental states and events that compatibilists appeal to. They also have all the virtues secured by an event-causal incompatibilist view: after all, they involve satisfaction of all of the same conditions

¹³ Carl Ginet, "Reasons Explanations of Action: Causalist versus Noncausalist Accounts," in Robert Kane (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 386–405.

¹⁴ Clarke, *Libertarian Accounts of Free Will*, pp. 145–146.

as an event-causal position, including the indeterministic causation by various events. But they provide more, Clarke thinks, for causation by the agent, he argues, provides a kind of active control of free action that goes beyond anything supplied by event-causalism and very well might be enough for genuine moral desert.

For all its virtues, however, Clarke thinks that any agent-causalist account, including an integrated agent-causal account, faces a grave difficulty: there are good reasons to think that agent-causation is impossible. In support of this contention, Clarke works carefully through a variety of arguments that have been offered for this conclusion. Although he thinks some arguments for the impossibility of agent-causation have been given greater credence than they deserve, he holds that, on balance, the evidence does suggest that agent-causation is, necessarily, nowhere to be found. It is a great testament to Clarke's intellectual honesty that he has reached this conclusion. In fact, the book is marked throughout by this virtue. Clarke accepts the conclusions that he must accept; he allows truth to be his guide. However, I want to suggest that one of the famous arguments against the possibility of agent-causation presents a greater difficulty to an integrated agent-causalism, in particular, than Clarke suggests. The difficulty stems from the integrated view's requirement that (*) be nomologically but not conceptually necessary.

Famously, C. D. Broad argued that, since events occur in time, at least some part of an event's total cause must occur in time. Since agents are not dated, but, rather, persist through time, an agent cannot be an event's total cause.¹⁵ Standardly, agent-causalists have claimed that the total cause of a free action is an agent; they have denied that free actions are event-caused at all (This is true, for instance, of Roderick Chisholm's brand of agent-causalism¹⁶). Hence, standardly, agent-causalists have fallen prey to this objection. Although Clarke thinks that there may be a serious problem for agent-causation deriving from the need for causes to be dated – he thinks there is a problem here if every cause, and not just a total cause, must be dated – he does not think that the objection, in the form raised by Broad, creates a problem for an integrated agent-

¹⁵ C. D. Broad, *Ethics and the History of Philosophy* (New York: Humanities Press, 1952), pp. 195–217.

¹⁶ Roderick Chisholm, "Freedom and Action," in Keith Lehrer (ed.), *Freedom and Determinism* (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 11–44.

causalism. After all, he argues, an integrated agent-causalist does not think that the agent is the total cause of a free action; on such a view, free actions are also caused by events, which are dated.

However, the problem is more serious for an integrated agent-causalist than Clarke allows. To see this, start with the following question: Under an integrated agent-causal position, are there possible worlds in which the agent causes her action, but the action is not caused by any events?¹⁷ In asking this question, we grant that in such a possible world the agent's action would not be free, but since it is the possibility of agent-causation, and not the analysis of free action provided by integrated agent-causalism that is at stake, to grant this is to grant very little. If the integrated agent-causalist answers the question in the negative, then he is denying that (*) is merely nomologically necessary, but is instead asserting that it is conceptually or logically necessary. So understood, integrated agent-causalism collapses into an event-causal theory under which agent-causation is reduced to causation by certain agent-involving events. But if the integrated agent-causalist answers the question in the affirmative, as he must, then there is a possible world in which an event is caused by an undated entity, an agent. This, as Broad pointed out, is simply not possible. There is no possible world in which it is so. In insisting that (*) is only nomologically necessary, the integrated agent-causalist commits himself to the possibility, even if not the actuality, of an agent's being the total cause of an event, something which does not seem possible. So, an integrated agent-causalist account falls prey to Broad's objection in its simplest form, the same form in which it plagues all other agent-causal views. The point here is, in a loose sense, Cartesian: if agent-causal influence is really distinct from event-causal influence, then it must be possible for it to exist independently; but it is just this possibility that Broad's objection challenges.

I started this review by noting that in the wake of the recognition that acceptance of determinism is not required by a commitment to

¹⁷ Clarke's acceptance of an event-causal theory of action commits him to the claim that an event that is not caused by any events is not an action, even if caused by an agent. Given this point, one might think that the answer to the question here is, necessarily and trivially, negative: there can be no possible worlds in which *the action* is caused by no events. To avoid this and still give the question some bite, it should be formulated thusly: Under an integrated agent-causal position, are there possible worlds in which the agent causes the event *E*, which is, in the actual world, her action, but *E* is not caused by any events?

naturalism, incompatibilist libertarianism has enjoyed a resurgence. Of course, a commitment to naturalism means more than just a commitment to constrain one's philosophical analyses by the facts as testified by the sciences. It also involves a commitment to appealing, in one's analyses, only to entities and relations that are naturally possible, that could be part of the universe's fabric without the help of something supernatural and mysterious, whether or not the sciences testify to their existence. Clarke's book marks a leap forward in our understanding of all the various forms of incompatibilism, particularly in its arguments for the claim that incompatibilists can build on, rather than reject, the insights contained in compatibilist theories of free action and causal theories of action. But the moral one might take from the book, which is somewhat different (although in the neighborhood) of the moral that Clarke takes, is that the prospects for a truly satisfactory incompatibilist account of free action rest on the shoulders of the event-causal libertarians, for agent-causation, in the end, is not the sort of thing that we can hope to find in this world, a world where nothing supernatural exists and all the events that happen, happen in time.

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