

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY—ITS ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL. A Report of a Study Group for the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, W. Y. Elliot, chairman, and others. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952. Pp. xviii, 288. \$3.75.

THE global ideological conflict and the necessity for constant preparedness and alertness to meet the challenge of the cold war, apt to explode any moment into a thermonuclear war, have placed before the free world unprecedented political, military and economic problems. It would be futile to oppose the Soviet power giant—in complete control of its industrial potential and public opinion, and well equipped for speedy military and political action—with a slow governmental apparatus. The governmental mechanism—and for that matter even the inter-governmental organization of Western democratic states—must be overhauled if Soviet actions are to be met and the survival of democracy against the communist assault assured, without endangering, however, the basic principles of a democratic society. This is especially true with regard to the United States whose responsibility as a leader of the free world calls for an efficiently conducted global foreign policy. In contrast to the outlived concept of *Realpolitik* which attempts to revive the system of balance of power,¹ as well as to the isolationist's naiveté which seeks a false security behind the Atlantic, the Study Group of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation realistically places the objectives of United States foreign policy and its instruments within the context of the *existing* world power conflict.

Striving to conceive of power and its role in international relations in the broadest sense possible—without, unfortunately, offering its precise description²—the *Report* warns against its underestimation which assumes that “merely by raising the standard of living we can meet everywhere the fundamental challenge of communism.”³ It equally admonishes against the opposite extreme which advocates a foreign policy of sheer balance of power, disregarding socially significant values, as a merely temporary device hardly able to assure the democracies of victory in the weary East-West conflict. Guns and butter together with the grant of fundamental human rights are the real weapons of democracy. The *Report* warns that “if democracies are seduced into giving up their essential strength as proponents of freedom and the conditions which assure the development of human morality in the world at large, they have suffered a major and perhaps a catastrophic defeat in the battle of ideas.”⁴

Technological development and intricate worldwide interdependence put the concept of security in a totally different light. World conditions have changed

1. For further criticism of this concept, see McDougal, *Law and Power*, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 102-114 (1952).

2. See LASSWELL, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 53 (1950).

3. P. 17. See also MANNHEIM, MAN AND SOCIETY IN AN AGE OF RECONSTRUCTION 249 (1948).

4. P. 22.

profoundly, but has the governmental mechanism of democracies kept up with this development? In the case of the United States, what are the shortcomings and what immediate and long term remedies are available?

"The form of government adopted in the American Constitution shows an eighteenth century emphasis upon a mechanistic conception of checks and balances, culminating in the threefold separation of powers."⁵ This separation of powers is today under severe strain caused by the greatly increased participation of Congress in formulating foreign policy on one hand, and on the other, by the urgent need for quick action and effective leadership by the President.⁶ Nothing could more dramatically illustrate the new role of Congress than a comparison of the acquisition of the Philippines in 1898, achieved without systematic Congressional examination,⁷ with the elaborate report and hearings conducted by the Congress on Lend Lease, UNRRA, the United Nations Charter, and that landmark in congressional handling of foreign matters, the European Recovery Program. Foreign affairs have become the dominant business of Congress as shown by the appropriation of three-fourths of the nation's budget to rearmament and foreign economic and military assistance.⁸ And within Congress, the House's control of the purse strings makes this body nearly as influential in the conduct of foreign affairs as the Senate.

The *Report* realizes the difficulties the President may encounter while discharging his ever-increasing duties in conducting the foreign policy of this country. Congressional support of his foreign policy is more important today than ever before; its lack could cripple any presidential leadership and deprive the President of executive discretion necessary in times of chronic crisis.⁹ It is impossible for any President to fight on two fronts—at home against Congress, and abroad against the Soviets. The Group seeks to alleviate the situation by (1) granting the power to ratify treaties to a majority of both Houses, (2) extending the term of Representatives to four years, and (3) granting the President the right when he cannot reach an agreement with Congress to dissolve that body and to appeal directly to the electorate.¹⁰

But Congress is not the only problem. The organization of the numerous administrative agencies and the coordination of their functions¹¹ are equally important for an effective discharge of foreign policy. The State Department, for example, has the immense task of formulating and conducting foreign policy through multilateral diplomacy in the United Nations and other world and regional organizations. In addition, the Department must channel and coordinate

5. P. 202.

6. Pp. 67-9.

7. CHEEVER & HAVILLAND, *AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS* 57-8 (1952).

8. P. 99.

9. P. 37.

10. Pp. 57-61.

11. P. 95.

all the activities of other administrative agencies that bear on the control of foreign affairs.¹²

The inadequate liaison between the State Department and the Pentagon seems to be the most serious deficiency,¹³ and it is aggravated by the lack of mutual understanding of the fundamental political and military problems. To a lesser degree, the same situation exists between the Department and the other administrative agencies active in the international field, frequently preventing the United States from "speaking in one voice" on all aspects of its foreign policy. This situation is particularly regrettable for the State Department, which, according to the forceful argument of the *Report*, must retain its primary responsibility for formulating foreign policy.¹⁴ The *Report* also proposes that the Department be entrusted with the exclusive administration of all foreign assistance programs. The Group recommends that the activity of the Secretary of State be concentrated on policy formulation, a task in which he is to be assisted by a Junior Secretary for Foreign Policy, and that all overseas operations should be left to a Secretary for Foreign Operations. Both the Junior Secretary and the Secretary for Foreign Operations, as non-Cabinet members, would be responsible to the Secretary of State.¹⁵ As far as effective coordination and concentration are concerned, these proposals seem to have greater merit than President Eisenhower's recent Reorganization Plan No. 7, 1953,¹⁶ establishing an independent Foreign Operation Administration to be in charge of practically all foreign assistance programs.

But neither an imaginative foreign policy nor the *Report's* proposed constitutional amendments have a chance of being implemented unless the citizen understands the issues at stake and the possible alternative solutions. If an educator of a leading university could declare that the Marshall Plan would "prevent European recovery and greatly promote the spread of communism," warning that "if you want to make the Kremlin the capital of the world adopt the Marshall Plan,"¹⁷ at a time when it was fairly obvious what the outcome would be if the United States did not rush to the economic rescue of Europe, one is prompted to pause and consider the grave absence of political education.

Although one might disagree with some of the *Report's* proposals, or deplore in places its lack of further elaboration,¹⁸ the Group has admirably formulated

12. In the period 1950-51, the United States attended no less than 351 international conferences on topics of importance to practically all departments of the executive. DEP'T STATE, PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES xvii (Publ. 4571, 1952).

13. P. 107.

14. P. 101.

15. Pp. 101-3.

16. Text in 28 DEP'T STATE BULL. 852-3 (1953).

17. *Hearings before Senate Foreign Relations Committee on European Recovery Program*, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1367, 1370 (1948).

18. The Group should have examined more closely the question of public support of United States foreign policy on NATO, as well as its own view that the United Nations

and presented the issues and proposed reforms. One should be reminded of Woodrow Wilson's admonition that "the Constitution was not meant to hold the Government back to the time of horses and wagons"¹⁹ when reading the *Report's* sober conclusion that "the United States government had taken on world wide responsibilities before [it learned] to organize its own affairs in a disciplined, coordinated, and responsible manner. Irresponsibility and lack of internal coordination now threatens to cancel out its great power."²⁰

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Universal Declaration of Human Rights "goes beyond existing practices of the most advanced constitutional states. . . ." P. 131.

19. WILSON'S IDEALS 28 (Padover ed. 1942).

20. P. 177.

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