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The SCALES project: Making federal court records freeFederal court records have been available online for nearly a quarter century, yet they remain frustratingly inaccessible to the public. This is due to two primary barriers: (1) the federal government’s prohibitively high fees to access the records at scale and (2) the unwieldy state of the records themselves, which are mostly text documents scattered across numerous systems. Official datasets produced by the judiciary, as well as third-party data collection efforts, are incomplete, inaccurate, and similarly inaccessible to the public. The result is a de facto data blackout that leaves an entire branch of the federal government shielded from empirical scrutiny. In this Essay, we introduce the SCALES project: a new data-gathering and data-organizing initiative to right this wrong. SCALES is an online platform that we built to assemble federal court records, systematically organize them and extract key information, and—most importantly—make them freely available to the public. The database currently covers all federal cases initiated in 2016 and 2017, and we intend to expand this coverage to all years. This Essay explains the shortcomings of existing systems (such as the federal government’s PACER platform), how we built SCALES to overcome these inadequacies, and how anyone can use SCALES to empirically analyze the operations of the federal courts. We offer a series of exploratory findings to showcase the depth and breadth of the SCALES platform. Our goal is for SCALES to serve as a public resource where practitioners, policymakers, and scholars can conduct empirical legal research and improve the operations of the federal courts. For more information, visit www.scales-okn.org.
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Lawyerless litigants, filing fees, transaction costs, and the federal courts: Learning from scalesTwo Latin phrases describing litigants—pro se (for oneself) and in forma pauperis (IFP, as a poor person)—prompt this inquiry into the relationship between self-representation and requests for filing fee waivers. We sketch the governing legal principles for people seeking relief in the federal courts, the sources of income of the federal judiciary, the differing regimes to which Congress has subjected incarcerated and nonincarcerated people filing civil lawsuits, and analyses enabled by SCALES, a newly available database that coded 2016 and 2017 federal court docket sheets. This Essay’s account of what can be learned and of the data gaps demonstrates the challenges of capturing activities in federal lawsuits and the burdens, unfairness, and inefficiencies of current federal court waiver practices.
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MultiparenthoodFamily law conventionally treats parenthood as binary: A child has two, and only two, parents. These two parents possess all parental rights and responsibilities, which cannot be shared with others. Their status as parents remains fixed throughout the child’s life. Today, legislatures are explicitly challenging this view. Ten jurisdictions now have multiparent statutes, i.e., laws that authorize courts to recognize more than two legal parents. Commentators tend to view this development as a radical change in the law intended to accommodate radical new family forms produced by assisted reproduction, LGBTQ family formation, and polyamory. But the accuracy of these assumptions—about the ways in which these statutes represent a break from the past and the types of families they capture—has remained unexamined. This Article is the first to do so through an empirical study. Analyzing all publicly available judicial decisions issued pursuant to multiparent statutes, we show that the families they accommodate are not novel and rare family arrangements involving planned and well-resourced LGBTQ parents, but instead more familiar and common ones, emerging out of re-partnering and caregiving by extended family members and often resulting from challenges related to poverty. We also show that extending parental rights to more than two people is a longstanding practice in family law. Drawing on a second dataset consisting of all publicly available judicial decisions applying a functional parent doctrine over four decades, we find that courts long have accommodated multiparent families. For decades, courts have authorized the sharing of parental rights and responsibilities across more than two individuals, often recognizing people who come into children’s lives long after their birth. Our empirical study of multiparent recognition challenges conventional assumptions about the life and law of parenthood itself. Families commonly construct parent-child relationships in ways that are nonbinary—sharing parental rights with more than one other person and altering a child’s parental unit over time. For their part, courts too have resisted a view of parenthood as binary. They have recognized that many children have more than two parents; that parental rights and responsibilities can be unbundled and shared; and that a child’s parents may change over time. Our empirical account also suggests that many of the concerns raised about multiparent recognition are inapposite or overstated. Imagining a planned multiparent amily with three involved parents, commentators worry that laws allowing multiparent recognition will produce bitter custody litigation, complicated tri-custody orders, and ongoing conflict with three parents sharing legal rights and responsibilities. Yet, across both datasets, the children rarely have three parents assuming parental responsibilities. Legal recognition of more than two parents typically promotes security and stability for children, not by protecting relationships with multiple involved parents, but instead—and counterintuitively—by protecting children’s primary parental relationship. Accordingly, our study leads us to be less concerned with too much multiparent recognition and instead to be more concerned with too little multiparent recognition.
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The Multicultural State: Progress or Tragedy?This essay is a short response to Daniel Bonilla Maldonado's contribution, »Beyond the State: Can State Law Survive in the Twenty-First Century?« to the recently published Cambridge History of Latin American Law in Global Perspective. While Bonilla sees progress in the movement from the centralized nation-state to the multicultural state, my essay argues for an appreciation of the values that motivated the creation of the unified state as a single constitutional order in the post-colonial period. This effort may have failed, but with that failure went a distinct and valuable idea of freedom.
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Foreign Affairs, Nondelegation, and Original Meaning: Congress's Delegation of Power to Lay Embargoes in 1794.Originalist proponents of a tougher nondelegation doctrine confront the many broad delegations that Congress enacted in the 1790s by claiming that each fell into some exceptional category to which the original nondelegation doctrine was inapplicable or weakly applicable, one being foreign affairs. There is lively debate on whether the founding generation actually recognized an exception to nondelegation principles for foreign affairs. This Article, commissioned for a symposium on “The Statutory Foreign Affairs Presidency,” intervenes in the debate by examining the Embargo Authorization Act of 1794, which empowered the President to lay an embargo on all ships in U.S. ports (and/or other classes of ships) if “the public safety shall so require,” for the upcoming five-month congressional recess. This was a delegation of remarkable power over the U.S. economy, which at the time depended heavily on maritime transport. An examination of the Act undermines the idea that there existed a foreign-affairs exception to cover it. Originalist proponents of a tougher nondelegation doctrine claim the doctrine was meant to protect private individual rights of liberty and property, yet Americans in the late 1700s lived in an economy that was more dependent on foreign commerce than it has ever been since, in which a five-month international embargo could be disastrous for private business nationwide. In this context, an “exception” for foreign affairs would be strange, turning economic reality on its head. Furthermore, the Act itself flouted any objective or even workable distinction between the foreign and the domestic. The Act’s unqualified use of the term “embargo” authorized the President to prohibit the departure of all ships, not only those sailing to foreign ports but also to other U.S. ports in the coastwise trade, which was then the main channel of U.S. domestic commerce. And even if the President were to impose an embargo aimed mainly at international maritime trade, preventing evasion of such a restriction required regulation of the coastwise trade—regulation that contemporaries apparently understood the Act to authorize.